Sharon Boyd, Editor/Publisher |
DallasArena.com Your alternative to The Dallas Managed News Brokaw v. DISD, Hinojosa, et al
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IN THE
SHERRI BROKAW, ? COMPLAINT NOW COMES SHERRI BROKAW, Plaintiff, and for cause of action against the Defendants DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT (?DISD?); MICHAEL HINOJOSA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, CELSO MARTINEZ, DAVID RASTELLINI, TROY L. COLEMAN, AND RONALD PEACE, Defendants, would show the Court and Jury as follows: I. INTRODUCTION 1. This is a civil rights case with pendent state law claims arising out of a pending investigation into possible credit card abuses within the Dallas Independent School District (?DISD?). Plaintiff is a contract employee with DISD who has been placed on administrative leave with pay from her duties as Director of Financial Control and Activity Funds of DISD. Plaintiff?s employment includes intermediate duties with respect to a program known as the Pcard program, which is undergoing scrutiny by an internal DISD investigation and the Dallas area news media. Plaintiff?s employment contract with DISD runs through August, 2007. II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. This is an action principally arising under 42 U.S.C. ?1983, et. seq., as well as the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ? 1331 et seq. This Court has pendant jurisdiction over the state law claims as pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ? 1367 et seq. 3. Venue is proper in this Court because the Defendants are located within this District and because a substantial amount of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims herein occurred within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. ?1391(b). III.PARTIES4. Plaintiff is a resident of Dallas County, Texas.5. Defendant DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT (?DISD?), is an independent school district under the laws of the State of Texas, the trustees of which is a body corporate under the laws of the State of Texas, and in whose name may be sued. DISD conducts its principal place of business in Dallas County, Texas. Service of process may be had on said Defendant by serving the President of the Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, JACK LOWE, at 3700 Ross Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75204.6. Defendant MICHAEL HINOJOSA, is an individual, and he is the General Superintendent of the Defendant, Dallas Independent School District. 7. Defendant CELSO MARTINEZ, is an individual and an Associate Superintendent of Communications and Community Relations with Defendant, DISD. 8. Defendant DAVID RASTELLINI, is an individual and an Associate Superintendent of Financial Services with Defendant, DISD. 9. Defendant TROY L. COLEMAN, is an individual and was an Associate Superintendent of Human Resources Services with Defendant, DISD, at all times relevant to this suit. 10. Defendant RONALD PEACE, is an individual and at all times relevant hereto, a Deputy Superintendent of the Business Services Division of Defendant, DISD. 11. Upon the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff intends to serve Defendants with a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Summons.
IV. The PCARD Program 12. On or about February 22, 1999, Plaintiff began working for Defendant DISD as a specialist in the Quality Control Department of DISD. 13. In about August, 1999, the DISD implemented a program known as the Pcard program to alleviate the backlog of small dollar purchases in the purchasing and accounts payable departments of DISD. National purchasing studies showed that on average it costs $100 to process a purchase order and therefore many times the processing cost exceeded the purchase amount. With these small dollar purchases being placed on a Pcard it would allow purchasing to spend their time on the more complex purchases and accounts payable to decrease the payment cycle time. 14. Plaintiff?s employment at DISD includes intermediate duties with respect to the new Pcard program. 15. In 2000, the State of Texas Comptroller?s office performed a Texas School Performance Review on DISD. One of the recommendations from the review was to move all purchases $1,000 and less to the Pcard. 16. In October 2002, DISD converted to the oracle financial system. To facilitate the transition all purchases were mandated to be made via a Pcard rather than the requisition/purchase order system. This mandate continued for at least six months. During this period the volume of Pcard purchases exceeded any period prior or to date. 17. In 2003 and 2005, process reviews and KPMG audits noted that the department was not staffed to adequately oversee the Pcard volume. During this period the department actually lost one staff member due to a reduction in force thereby increasing duties for all remaining staff members. The ?Investigation? 18. In the Spring of 2006, the Dallas Morning News began an investigation into alleged misuse of the DISD Pcard program. With DISD permission, Plaintiff provided a background interview with a reporter for the Dallas Morning News, and then participated in an ?on the record? interview with the same reporter and with other employees of the DISD. At all times, Plaintiff cooperated fully with DISD officials in the face of the ?investigation.? 19. In July, 2006, a series of news articles appeared in the Dallas Morning News about their investigation into the Pcard program. As a result, on or about July 3, 2006, Defendant Hinojosa suspended the Pcard program, and on or about July 17, 2006, Defendant DISD hired outside investigators to review allegations made about the Pcard program, including allegations of criminal and policy misconduct. 20. In a letter dated July 18, 2006, Defendant Rastellini, DISD and Defendants Hinojosa, Coleman, and Peace, placed Plaintiff on administrative leave with pay. Plaintiff was advised of such action on July 19, 2006. 21. In one statement, the administrative leave letter to Plaintiff stated: ?Based upon allegations of potential misconduct, which will be investigated, I am hereby placing you on administrative leave with pay pending the outcome of that investigation.? 22. In another statement, the administrative leave letter to Plaintiff stated: ?Please understand this action does not imply guilt or any wrongdoing by you. Nor does it indicate any disciplinary action on the part of the District.? 23. On or about July 20, 2006, however, the Dallas Morning News published an article in which Defendant Celso Martinez publicly impugned Ms. Brokaw?s integrity, reputation, and competence, and implicitly accused Ms. Brokaw of wrongdoing, misconduct and guilt in connection with the ?credit card investigation?. Mr. Martinez falsely reported to the News that Ms. Brokaw was suspended with pay. Mr. Martinez further stated that Ms. Brokaw was one of ?the ones that floated up to the surface pretty quickly? in an investigation into district credit card spending. He also stated that ?[T]here are questions of competence. She [Ms. Brokaw] should have caught? problems with the credit card program. 24. Plaintiff will show that officers, agents, employees and attorneys for Defendant DISD then instructed Plaintiff that she was not to talk to the media or any other person outside of DISD about the allegations of potential misconduct, yet Plaintiff was ?directed to be available during the work hours, 8 a.m. ? 5 p.m. for any purpose deemed appropriate by the District during your administrative leave.? [Emphasis added]. 25. On or about August 11, 2006, Plaintiff, through counsel, demanded of Defendant DISD notice of the ?allegations of potential misconduct? referenced in the leave letter, and implied in the Dallas Morning News article of July 20, 2006. Furthermore, counsel for Plaintiff specifically requested that the ?alleged misconduct? be identified so Plaintiff could ?clear her name and return to her job as soon as possible.? Both requests for identification of the alleged misconduct and for an opportunity to clear Plaintiff?s name were refused by Defendants. 26. On or about December 11, 2006, DISD officials directed that Plaintiff appear for an ?interview? about the Pcard program. Once again, Plaintiff, through counsel, demanded the nature and scope of the ?interview? and once again demanded the identification of the ?allegations of potential misconduct? so Plaintiff could be prepared to clear her good name. All such requests were refused. 27. On or about December 26, 2006, Plaintiff, once again through counsel, made formal demand for the nature and cause of the allegations of potential misconduct against her, and the matters referenced by Defendant Martinez in the Dallas Morning News article of Jury 20, 2006. 28. Yet, thereafter, DISD once again refused Plaintiff?s due process requests and demanded that Plaintiff appear at DISD offices for an ?interview? on January 4, 2007. 29. Plaintiff will show that the Defendants' true objective in placing Plaintiff on administrative leave, muzzling her, and threatening her with disciplinary action if she defended herself in the court of public opinion was to deflect attention from the District's failures and instead make her a scapegoat in light of criticism of the PCard program and, similarly, the intent of the proposed "interview" was to carry out this scheme by concocting areas of potential disciplinary action against Plaintiff.
V. A. Section 1983 Claims 30. Procedural Due Process. Acting under color of state law, Defendants, jointly and severally, have deprived Plaintiff of her due process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from arbitrary deprivation of property and liberty interests, and the right of Plaintiff, a public employee, to be free of false, stigmatizing charges by state officials which damage her reputation. 31. Procedural Due Process. Acting under color of state law, Defendants, jointly and severally, have deprived Plaintiff of her due process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution to be apprised of the allegations of potential misconduct which are affecting her public employment status with Defendant DISD. 32. Procedural Due Process. Acting under color of state law, Defendants, jointly and severally, have deprived Plaintiff of her due process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution to a name clearing hearing in light of the public allegations made by Defendant Martinez about Plaintiff in the July 20, 2006, Dallas Morning News article, referenced above. 33. Substantive Due Process. Acting under color of state law, Defendants, jointly and severally, have deprived Plaintiff of her substantive and procedural due process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Plaintiff?s First Amendment rights by refusing Plaintiff a name-clearing hearing and then attempting to silence Plaintiff?s free speech rights in an effort to clear her good name. B. Pendent State Law Claims 34. For further cause of action against Defendant CELSO MARTINEZ, Plaintiff will show that said Defendant MARTINEZ defamed Plaintiff as a result of the false statements made CELSO about Plaintiff in the July 20, 2006, Dallas Morning News article, as set out above. C. Damages 35. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant MARTINEZ?S actions and/or omissions, Plaintiff has suffered serious injuries, including grief, mental pain, anguish, loss of employment opportunities in the future, damage to reputation, and lost income potential. Plaintiff will continue to suffer with these injuries for a long time into the future, if not for the balance of her natural life. VI. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 36. Plaintiff asserts and will show that the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, as their conduct was not objectively reasonable in light of the facts existing at the time, and the law clearly established at the time of the injuries sustained by Plaintiff as a result of Defendants? unlawful actions. VII. Attorney?s Fees 37. If Plaintiff prevails in this action, by settlement or otherwise, Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby demands attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. VIII. Demand for Jury Trial 38. Plaintiff demands trial by jury of all issues properly triable by jury herein. IX. Prayer 39. Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, as follows: a. An order that Defendants afford Plaintiff due notice of any ?allegations of potential misconduct? affecting Plaintiff?s contract rights with DISD; b. An order that, after due notice is given to Plaintiff, Defendants afford Plaintiff a full and fair name-clearing hearing; c. An order that prevents Defendants from interfering with Plaintiff?s First Amendment right of free speech and any efforts to clear Plaintiff?s good name; d. An order that prohibits Defendants from any retaliatory action against Plaintiff during the remaining period of her contract with DISD for filing this action and exercising her constitutional rights; e. As to the state law defamation claim, special damages according to proof; f. As to the state law defamation claim, general damages according to proof; g. As to the state law defamation claim, punitive and exemplary damages according to proof; h. Costs of suit and reasonable attorney?s fees; i. Prejudgment and post judgment interest on any monetary damage award at the highest rate allowed by law; and, f. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES M. MURPHY /s/ James M. Murphy _____________________________
P.O. Box
140809 Counsel For PlaintiffDated: January 4, 2007. |
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